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ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTRICITY
DEREGULATION: A CASE STUDY OF SAN DIEGO GAS &
ELECTRIC IN A DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKET
COLIN DRUKKER"
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, government regulation of the economy has been
relaxed to foster competition. Certainly, not every sector of the public utility
industry has undergone the same degree of reform. In the airline and truck-
ing industries, for example, where few barriers to competition existed, price
and entry regulations have been eliminated. Changes in industry and regula-
tory structures for electricity, however, are more complex, and hence the
pace of change has been slower.' Electricity is the largest industry in the
world, running everything from our houses to our businesses to our hospi-
tals. Any changes to the electricity industry will therefore be felt by billions
of customers and consumers.
In September 1996, AB 1890 deregulated the monopolized electricity
generation market in San Diego by introducing competition into the market.
This change has the potential to affect not only the San Diego residents who
purchase their electricity from San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) but also
every economic transaction that occurs with a San Diego electricity con-
sumer.2 If one also considers the potential effects on the safety and reliability
of electricity service, it becomes apparent that the effects of AB 1890 must
* Colin Drukker, Master's Candidate in Urban & Regional Planning at the University of
California, Irvine. B.A. in Urban Studies & Planning at the University of California, San
Diego. I would like to thank Keith Pezzoli, Michael Schudson, and Scott Bollens for their
helpful comments and suggestions and particularly their candor. Any errors made are mine
and mine alone.
1. See Lewis J. Perl, Regulatory Restructuring in the United States, 6 UTIL. POL'Y 21,
21-34 (1997).
2. For example, if AB 1890 produces higher electricity costs for the San Diego Shoe
Company (a fictional company), the shoe company will pass that cost on to its customers,
who will, in turn, have less capital to save or spend on other goods or services. Conversely, if
AB 1890 produces lower electricity costs, customers and consumers will have more capital to
save or spend on goods and services.
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be heavily scrutinized to ensure that San Diego operates under the safest,
cheapest, and most reliable electricity service possible.
Deregulation is affecting many industries worldwide, such as telecom-
munications, airlines, trucking, and electricity. The electricity industry is by
far the largest of the markets, and deregulation of this industry has been
heavily studied. Electricity deregulation, however, has been primarily stud-
ied at global, national, or state levels. This article focuses on the regional
reaction to deregulation.
Although simple in theory, deregulation policies are often misunder-
stood. Researchers categorize deregulation as one of three methods by which
the government structures and controls public utilities; the other two meth-
ods are antitrust legislation and public enterprising.3 When competition was
deemed feasible but would not work due to aggressive firms or conspirato-
rial agreements, the government enforced antitrust legislation.' If there ex-
isted a lack of incentives to induce the private sector to provide services, the
government created public enterprises,5 such as the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority.6 In the case of natural monopolies, the government has regulated
prices to protect consumers and promote the efficient operation of utilities.
Conversely, when these monopolistic enterprises grew inefficient or when
changes occurred enabling competition, the government has deregulated
these same markets.
While these categories may make the decision to deregulate an industry
appear simple and uncontroversial, the reality is that the appropriateness of
deregulation is hotly contested in political, academic, and economic arenas.
The issue most often debated is whether deregulation leads to greater effi-
ciency and lower prices. Those who support deregulation contend that it cre-
ates diversification and competition, which can only enhance efficiency
Critics warn, however, of collusive behavior and stress the need for coopera-
tion and stability in utility markets.8
3. See JOEL DARMSTADTER, ENERGY TODAY & TOMORRow 150-51 (1983). Darmstadter
considers deregulation to be a part of the regulatory method. See id.
4. See id. at 150. For example, in 1982, AT&T was forced to relinquish its 22 Bell Sys-
tem companies, as well as the Bell name, as a result of an antitrust suit. See Hal Hellman,
Telephone, in 19 ACADEMIC AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 80 (1983). These companies were
then reorganized into seven regional companies to provide local telephone service. See id.
While AT&T was allowed to keep its long-distance telephone business, it is now faced with a
large amount of competition from companies such as MCI and Sprint. See id.
5. See JAMES C. WILLIAMS, ENERGY & THE MAKING OF MODERN CALIFORNIA 260-62
(1997).
6. Created in 1933 by Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
helped to promote flood control, navigation, and the sale of electric power. See Lee S. Grene,
Tennessee Valley Authority, in 19 ACADEMIC AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 107-08 (1983). Al-
though private power companies opposed the TVA, the production and sale of hydroelectric
power was considered a legal by-product of flood-control and navigation dams. See id.
7. See MICHAEL A. CREW ED., DEREGULATION & DIVERSIFICATION OF UTILrrIES 43-44
(1989).
8. See id. at 143.
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Looking at California's past energy policies,9 there is a strong propen-
sity toward restrictive or heavily regulated energy policies developed to pro-
tect the consumer."0 These policies, however, have ignored the preservation
of energy resources and thereby contributed to the degradation of the natural
environment. Moreover, these policies were subject to the same kind of col-
lusive behavior feared in a deregulated market." Although government in-
volvement in energy management is recognized as a necessity, a deregulated
market is drawing increasing support as the better method of managing en-
ergy's future use.
Some argue that we must achieve greater energy efficiency in the future
or risk draining the environment of all its resources. Others argue for the
same increased efficiency for economic reasons. Both agree, however, that
present energy technologies are not being maximized, and new energy poli-
cies are necessary to raise energy standards. 2 As the world's consumption of
energy rises sharply over the next thirty-to-fifty years, our supply of fossil
fuels will not satisfy this demand without seriously compromising the
world's resources. 3 To avoid future environmental damage, current energy
policies must be restructured to take into account the overall impact of en-
ergy use on society.'"
In addition to environmental concerns, policy makers must also consider
the role of a utility as an essential service 5 when altering public utility pol-
icy. Utilities are essential services used by every stratum of the social and
economic community. A change in utility policy, therefore, can directly af-
fect every user and beneficiary of that utility. For example, deregulation
policies can eliminate entire sectors of the government while also instigating
an increase in new businesses and foreign investment.'6 These changes may
9. For a more detailed history of Califomia's regulatory past, see WILLIAMS, supra note
5, at 237-347.
10. Some examples include the Forest Management Act of 1897, the Water Power Act of
1920, and the Central Valley Project Act of 1930. See id. at 238, 244-45, 262-63. Very few
regulations existed at the turn of the 2 0 century. See generally id. As electricity supply and
demand grew, however, the United States and the state of California saw the need to regulate
the use of land and the control of energy by private parties. See generally id. This trend con-
tinued into the 1960s when confidence in government regulatory agencies peaked due largely
to a strong economy and plentiful energy supplies. See generally id.
11. Examples of private sector collusive agreements are price and supply fixing. When
these agreements are performed by the public sector, they are called controls. Many, such as
California Senator Peace or consumer advocate groups such as the Utility Reform Network
(TURN), blame these controls for the above-average prices Californians have been paying for
electricity. See The Utility Reform Network, TURN=Consumer Power (visited Feb. 14, 2000)
<http://www.turn.orglturn/tumarticles/home.htm>.
12. See DANiELT. SPRENG, NET ENERGY ANALYSIS 3 (1988).
13. For a discussion on the stocks, flows, and impacts of the Earth's energy resources,
see ROBERT HILL ET AL., THE FUTURE OF ENERGY USE 84-94 (1995).
14. See id. at 47.
15. For purposes of this article, an essential service is one that is necessary to complete
the fundamental tasks of everyday life, based on the present standard of living in California.
16. See PETER VAN BERGEuK & ROBERT HAFFNE, PRIVATIZATION, DEREGULATION, &
3
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alter the job market, which may in turn alter the distribution of income
within the area.
Examining the results of macro-level deregulation should allow one to
see larger trends and patterns. Overall, however, the consensus is that the
impacts of deregulation are as varied as the number of countries who have
implemented these policies. The strategy for creating the best policy depends
upon factors such as the strength of the private sector, the distribution of in-
come, and the system of government. 7 In addition, policy reforms in one
market are interdependent upon the success of other markets. 8 This com-
plexity demonstrates that there is no "one size fits all" conclusion on the ef-
fects of deregulation on electric companies and consumers. Deregulation
must be examined on a case-by-case basis.
This article adds to the body of literature on deregulation by examining
the experience of regional deregulation and the effects of deregulation on an
investor-owned company. 9 Because the majority of electricity deregulation
takes place in countries where the governments own the electricity compa-
nies, current deregulation literature focuses on large-scale issues and lacks
regional case studies involving private companies." This article focuses on
the economic effects of deregulation on the San Diego region and the pri-
vately owned electricity provider, SDG&E. 2
Part I of this article examines why California deregulated the electricity
industry and how AB 1890 was designed to achieve deregulation. Part II fo-
cuses on the economic effects of a deregulated electricity generation market
on SDG&E in three specific areas: the modification of SDG&E's role as an
electric utility, the reconfiguration of SDG&E's financial strategy, and the
reactions of SDG&E customers.
THE MACROECONOMY 35 (1996).
17. See id. at 34.
18. For more discussion on the interdependence of reform in markets, see id. at 38.
19. For purposes of this article, an investor-owned company is one owned by private
citizens as opposed to governments.
20. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE,
OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION IN OECD CoUNTRIEs 33 (1994).
21. This article has been compiled using relevant documents, news accounts, and formal
interviews with SDG&E employees. A historical analysis of SDG&E's electricity rates and
investment decisions was used to determine the effects of deregulation. Using electricity rates,
investment decisions, and descriptions of the customer base, I compared the rates and invest-
ments on an annual basis to determine the degree of fluctuation since the first day of deregula-
tion on March 31, 1998. A simple numerical study of the number of consumers leaving
SDG&E was used to determine how electricity consumers are reacting to deregulation and
SDG&E. Electricity rates and investment decisions of SDG&E were compared from 1993 to
1998 while consumer reaction was compared from October, 1997 to September, 1998. A con-
clusive causal relationship between changes in SDG&E and market deregulation will not,
however, be evident for many years. This article is simply a first appraisal of an ongoing
process, uncovering the beginning trends of structural change, energy investment, and con-
sumer behavior in San Diego's deregulated electricity market.
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I. WHY DID DEREGULATION HAPPEN AND WHAT IS AB 1890?
In 1974, the oil crisis caused by the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries began to wreak havoc on United States oil prices. Oil prices
increased from $2.53 per barrel in 1970 to $15.76 in 1974. To counteract the
increase in the cost of foreign oil, the federal government created the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policy Act in 1978.2 This Act required utilities to buy
power from unregulated generators to encourage the use of alternative fuel
sources such as wind, solar, water, and waste, thereby reducing America's
reliance on foreign fuel. In 1992, the National Energy Policy Act allowed
additional types of unregulated companies to generate and sell electricity to
public utilities.' California's electricity market, however, remained under
the control of three government-sanctioned, investor-owned electrical com-
panies. 4 The state, through the California Public Utilities Commission, regu-
lated how much these utilities charged and what services they offered. In
1995, California legislators found that the three regulated companies charged
citizens as much as fifty percent more than the national average charged by
providers of utilities.' In an effort to drive prices down, legislators passed
AB 1890 in September 1996 and deregulated California's electricity genera-
tion industry.26 The Bill passed without opposition, carrying the support of
Republicans, Democrats, utilities, labor, environmentalists, farmers, con-
sumers, and small businesses.27
Through AB 1890, California created a new electricity market structure,
ending the utility monopoly on generation and opening the market to compe-
tition so that customers could choose among alternative electric energy sup-
pliers.28 The transmission and distribution of electric energy, however, con-
22. During the 1960s, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
worked to prevent any decrease in the price of oil. See Lynn Turgeon, Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries, in ACADEMIC AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 441 (1983). In the follow-
ing decade, however, OPEC strove to increase oil prices, as shown by the 622% increase in
Libyan oil. See id. In addition, the Arab members of OPEC imposed an oil embargo on coun-
tries supporting Israel during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. See id.
23. See California Public Utilities Commission, Plug in, California! (visited Apr. 25,
2000) <http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/divisions/CSDIELECTRIC/PlainEnglish981030.htm>.
24. Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), and SDG&E
served as geographic monopolies. PG&E services most of northern California and parts of
central California; SCE services parts of central and southern California; and SDG&E ser-
viced San Diego County.
25. See James P. Sweeney, Electric Deregulation Sparks Some Doubts, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Aug. 10, 1997, at B1.
26. AB 1890 was signed into law on September 23, 1996 as chapter 854. See California
Legislature, Bill Number: AB 1890 (visited Feb. 13, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_1851-1900/ab_1890_bili_960924schaptered.html>.
27. See John Herrington, On the Right Path with Electricity Deregulation, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Feb. 12, 1998, at B9.
28. See California Legislature, Bill Number: AB 1890 (visited Feb. 13, 2000)
<http:llwww.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96fbill/asmiab 1851-1900/ab_1890_bill_960924chaptered.
html>.
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tinued to be regulated as monopoly services.
One of the most important components of AB 1890 is the Competition
Transition Charge (CTC)-a charge billed to all customers of California's
investor-owned utilities "to recover the cost of past capital investments, in-
cluding power plants and other generating assets," which were poor invest-
ments in light of the shift to a competitive market.29
Another important component of AB 1890 is the deregulation of the
electricity generation market and the introduction of competition by means
of a four-year transition period that began on March 31, 1998." This transi-
tion period will allow the utilities to charge a Competition Transition
Charge. At the end of the four-year period, the market will be completely de-
regulated.
II. EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION
A. The Modification of SDG&E's Role as an Electricity Utility
Growth in market size and technological changes have ended scale
economies and made competition more feasible in the electricity industry.
As more competitors enter the electricity generation market, both the possi-
bility and necessity of deregulation increases.3' In 1996, California senators
felt that deregulation was not only possible but absolutely necessary. Sena-
tors Steve Peace and James Brulte authored California's deregulation
legislation, AB 1890. AB 1890 forces SDG&E to compete with other
electricity generators, and significantly alters the basic structure of electricity
consumption in San Diego. In addition, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) created the Power Exchange (PX)32 and the
Independent System Operator (ISO)"3 to work in conjunction with AB 1890,
thereby further re-structuring San Diego's electricity market (see Figure 1).
29. Doug Kline & Ed Van Herik, SDG&E Cuts Base Rates in Move Expected to Spur
Competitive Electric Market, SDG&E PRESS RELEASE, Feb. 18, 1999, <http:llwww.
sdge.com/aboutus/newsroomlsdgenews.html>.
30. Although the initial date was set as January 1, 1998, computer glitches forced a three
month delay.
31. See Perl, supra note 1, at 22-23.
32. The PX is a system run by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that institutes
a competitive spot market for electric power through the auction of generation and demand
bids. See California Public Utilities Commission, Glossary, (visited Feb. 14, 2000)
<http:llwww.cpuc.ca.gov/electric-restructuringlesp-yegistrationlglossary.htm>. All electricity
generators must sell their electricity through the PX. See id.
33. A system run by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that is "responsible for
the operation and control of the statewide transmission grid," formerly the responsibility of
PG&E. SCE, and SDG&E. Id.
296 [Vol. 36
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FIGURE 1 - ELECTRICITY NETWORK IN SAN DIEGO
Businesses
Before Deregulation
Electricty
Generator
After Dereglation
Electricity
Geerator
Before deregulation, SDG&E was the only source of electricity for the
majority of San Diegans.3" SDG&E bought or generated electricity, transmit-
ted it over long distances through large power lines, and finally distributed
the electricity into homes and businesses through smaller distribution lines.
Under deregulation, many electricity generation companies unassociated
with SDG&E can produce electricity and send it over SDG&E's transmis-
sion lines. These other companies, however, may not have been able to ef-
fectively communicate with SDG&E had it not been for the creation of the
PX and ISO. The PX is controlled by the FERC. The PX buys electricity
34. SDG&E acted as an electricity provider-a company that obtains electricity by
means of generation or procurement and then offers it for sale.
Government
Government
Eledticity
Transmitter Distrutor
Businesses
Homes
-Government
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from the generators and sells it to distributors such as SDG&E. The PX ob-
tains power from qualifying facilities, nuclear units, and the lowest-bidding
suppliers. All electricity generators must sell their electricity through the PX.
The ISO is also controlled by the FERC and schedules the power trans-
actions and access to the transmission system. To facilitate this, the electric
utilities will transfer to the ISO their control over the operation of their
transmission facilities." SDG&E will still, however, maintain ownership of
all the transmission and distribution facilities. These operations account for
more than seventy percent of a consumer's electricity bill and will continue
to be regulated under AB 1890.36
Nevertheless, the PX and ISO have significantly diminished SDG&E's
role as an electric utility. SDG&E is no longer free to set the prices for elec-
tricity or decide which generators will supply San Diego with electricity.
Under the regime of regulation, SDG&E set the prices according to its costs
of production and profit margin. While this price was regulated by the Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), SDG&E always maintained a
generous profit margin.37 Thus, the foregoing pricing structure did not create
an environment that promoted the lowest possible price for electricity. The
new market structure compels SDG&E to become a more efficient organiza-
tion if it wants to lower prices and remain in the electricity generation mar-
ket.
SDG&E examined the possibility of competing with other generators
and decided to modify its structure. SDG&E's utility-related businesses were
combined to achieve vertical integration. Utility operations consisted of
power generation, transmission, and distribution. Restructuring as a holding
company enabled SDG&E to set aside the power generation business as a
subsidiary and a separate, open market competitor.38 Transforming power
generation into a subsidiary business enabled SDG&E to separate the debts
associated with electricity generation from those connected to transmission
and distribution. Since transmission and distribution will continue to be
regulated, SDG&E is guaranteed to reclaim any debts linked with these ser-
vices. Separating the debts allows SDG&E to create a more efficient and
profitable electricity generation company.
B. The Reconfiguration of SDG&E's Financial Strategy
SDG&E began transforming its role as an electricity generator early in
1993 after it learned that the deregulation of California's electric industry
35. See ENOVA CORPORATION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 33 (1998). Enova Corporation is an
energy management company and is the parent company of SDG&E.
36. Telephone Interview with Tom Acuna, Land Planner for SDG&E (Jan. 6, 1998).
37. See generally ENOVA CORPORATION, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1999); ENOVA
CORPORATION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1998); ENOVA CORPORATION, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT
(1997); SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
38. See generally ENOVA CORPORATION, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT (1997).
[Vol. 36
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was inevitable. As a result, five years of preparation created significant al-
terations in SDG&E's financial strategy. SDG&E has chosen to divest all of
its Californian electricity generation assets, invest in power plants outside of
California, and reinvest its recent profits to lower base electricity rates.39
SDG&E generated forty-six percent of the electricity it sold in 1993.'
By 1997, the percentage of electricity generated by SDG&E dropped to
thirty-two percent. SDG&E recognized that the guaranteed profits would
remain in the regulated markets of transmission and distribution. SDG&E
owned billions of dollars in electricity generation plants that could continue
to generate electricity but not profits in a deregulated environment. Although
it could have recovered a portion of these capital losses through the CTC
charge, SDG&E concluded that its best option was to auction the power
plants to the highest bidder. Its economic philosophy was founded on the
most basic concept of marginal utility. By 1997, the cost of each additional
kilowatt hour was simply too high to compete in a deregulated electricity
market.42 As a result, the first year of deregulation saw SDG&E divest all of
its electric generating assets in California-primarily power plants.
Once SDG&E placed its power plants on the auction block, several of
the most important, although unintended, effects of deregulation became ap-
parent. Fierce competition between potential buyers dramatically increased
the plants' selling prices. For example, Dynergy, Inc. and NRG Energy, Inc.
joined together and outbid the city of Carlsbad for the Encina Power Plant. 3
The two energy companies viewed the forty-five-year-old fossil fuel plant as
an electricity generator while the city of Carlsbad sought to purchase the
power plant to redevelop the land into residential and open-space property.
The final purchase price, $356 million, proved too high for the city of Carls-
bad. Meanwhile, SDG&E earned over $262 million in profit from the sale.
This example is not meant to imply that all power plants will simply change
owners. Rather, it demonstrates how deregulation's impact on SDG&E has
resulted in an increase in competition amongst a wide spectrum of players in
the electric market.
The greater variety of potential buyers translates into an increased num-
ber of disparate land uses and economic impacts. This point can be illus-
39. Although SDG&E divested its interest in the generation facilities in California,
SDG&E will still maintain the transmission and distribution lines. This is an important point
in the issue of reliability and safety, particularly in a time of crisis. For example, if an earth-
quake damages a power plant owned by Company "X," and SDG&E formerly owned Com-
pany "X," then SDG&E would be responsible for repairing any damaged transmission or dis-
tribution lines connected to the plant.
40. See SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1995).
41. See generally ENOVA CORPORATION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1998).
42. See id. at 2-22.
43. Dynergy Inc. is based in Houston while NRG Energy Inc. is based in Minneapolis.
See Craig D. Rose & Agnes Roletti, Power Plant in Carlsbad is Sold, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., Dec. 15, 1998, at Cl. The partnership also recently purchased two plants in the Los
Angeles area. See id.
9
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trated by the South Bay Power Plant, another fossil fuel generation plant,
which is six years younger than the Encina Plant yet sold for only $110 mil-
lion, which was still $20 million more than its original market value. The
San Diego Unified Port District, however, purchased this plant for purposes
of future redevelopment." In fact, the future of many power plants may be
redevelopment. Once the Encina Plant stops operating, San Diego wants to
turn the property into a nonindustrial use such as parkland or a resort hotel.
Despite planning to sell off all of its Californian electricity-generating
assets, SDG&E has not abandoned the electricity generation market.'5
SDG&E knew that electricity generation outside of California would remain
profitable. In 1998, SDG&E entered into a partnership with Houston Indus-
tries to build an electricity generation plant in Las Vegas, Nevada. The new
plant, called El Dorado Energy Plant, will service California, Nevada, and
Arizona." Consequently, deregulation has actually increased SDG&E's po-
tential customer base more than ten-fold. Prior to deregulation, SDG&E ser-
viced three million individuals throughout the San Diego County. The Las
Vegas plant will have potential access to more than thirty-eight million cus-
tomers. Thus, while SDG&E abandons the local generation of electricity,
San Diego residents could presumably purchase power from SDG&E
through the generating facility in Nevada.
The third way SDG&E is altering its financial strategy is by adjusting
its method of rate-setting. Prior to deregulation, SDG&E, as a public utility,
charged customers an electric rate that was determined and regulated by the
California Public Utilities Commission. When deregulation was introduced,
AB 1890 provided for a four-year transition period that froze SDG&E's
rates at levels in effect on June 10, 1996 (see Table 1) and allowed SDG&E
to charge a CTC.4 By the end of the first year of deregulation, SDG&E had
44. See id.
45. See Michael Kinsman, Countdown to Competition: California's Power Market De-
regulates, SAN DIEGO UNION TRiB., Nov. 26, 1997, at Al. It is interesting to note that the
value of SDG&E's real estate investments soared from $28 million in 1994 to $126 million in
1997. See generally ENOVA CORPORATION, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT (1997); ENOVA
CORPORATION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1998). The net value of SDG&E's electric utility
plants dropped from $900 million in 1997 to $700 million in 1998. SDG&E plans to sell its
20% interest in the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant and the 19 combustion turbines, which
would reduce the net value of its generating assets to $0. See Doug Kline, San Diego Gas &
Electric to Auction Power Plants, Other Generating Assets (visited Nov. 16, 1999)
<http:llwww.sdge.comlAbout/cc_2142.html>. For a complete breakdown of SDG&E's finan-
cial information, see ENOVA CORPORATION, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 33-50; ENOvA
CORPORATION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 41-59; ENOVA CORPORATION, 1996 FORM 10-K 27-29
(1997).
46. See Paula Bryant, A Powerful Opportunity: But Questions Surround Sale of Carlsbad
Plant, SAN DIEGO UNION TRiB., Jan. 7, 1998, at BI.
47. For the purposes of this article, the term "rate-setting" describes the variable with
which SDG&E determines the price per kilowatt hour (rate) it will charge for electricity. The
two types described in this article are regulation-based rate-setting and market-based rate-
setting. The former is determined by the government while the latter is set by the market.
48. See supra Part I.
[Vol. 36
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earned more than $600 million in profit from the sale of its generation assets
and estimated full recovery of all uneconomic generation costs 9 caused by
AB 1890s provisions by July 1, 1999."0 This allowed SDG&E to terminate
the transition period's rate freeze and permanently switch from regulation-
based rates to market-based rates.5' The initial impact on a large number of
SDG&E electric customers was higher electricity rates. SDG&E paid an av-
erage of 4.1 cents/kilowatt hour for July 1999, compared to 3.6 centsikilo-
watt hour for June 1999.52 This brought the average total cost of a typical
electricity bill to $44.37 for July, as opposed to $40.38 for June. 3
So what does this mean to SDG&E electricity consumers? Did deregu-
lation eliminate the barrier of regulated prices only to produce higher prices,
or has not enough time elapsed for competition to fully integrate? Those
skeptical of deregulation point to the fact that SDG&E has switched to mar-
ket-based rates just in time for summer, the time of year when southern Cali-
fornia electricity usage typically peaks due to increased usage of fans and air
conditioners. Supporters of deregulation believe that the transition to market-
based rates will encourage more competition that will inevitably result in
lower prices.' This change in rate-setting illustrates how SDG&E is adapt-
ing its financial strategy to take full advantage of an early shift to a fully
competitive electricity market. By moving to market-based rate-setting early,
SDG&E enters a competitive market with few competitors and is thus able
to charge higher electric rates.55 In, theory, however, it is just a matter of
time before more competitors arrive, compelling SDG&E to lower their
prices or risk losing customers. In any case, the market's behavior is ulti-
mately dependent upon customer reaction.
C. Reactions of SDG&E's Electricity Customers
Deregulation forces SDG&E to compete with other companies for cus-
tomers it had legally owned for seventy-two years. These companies are ea-
ger to attract a percentage of San Diego's previously restricted electricity
49. Uneconomic generation costs are the costs of past capital investments, including
power plants and other generating assets, which were rendered poor investments by the shift
to a competitive market.
50. See California Public Utilities Commission, Decision 99-05-051 May 27, 1999 (vis-
ited April 26, 2000) <ftp:llftp.cpuc.ca.gov/gopher-datalelec__restructldecisionslD99-05-
051.doc>, available in <http:llwww.cpuc.cagov/electric restructuringldecisions.html>.
51. SDG&E's application with the CPUC was approved on May 27, 1999. See id.
52. See Craig D. Rose, Higher Charge for Energy Use: Deregulated SDG&E Costs Ex-
pected to Rise 10% or More, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Aug. 12, 1999, at C1.
53. This assumes the same usage for both months. See id.
54. See id.
55. As of March 1999, only 33 suppliers were actively offering electricity. See Craig D.
Rose, Deregulation? Ho-hum: It's a Year Old Today, and So Far California Has Seen Few
Changes in Electricity Market, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 31, 1999, at Cl. Even Enron
Corporation, the nation's largest independent power company, dropped out of California's
electric markets. See id.
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market. The actions of San Diego's 1.2 million consumers will therefore de-
termine the short-term viability of SDG&E's electric generation operations.
AB 1890 was advertised as a move towards a more competitive electric-
ity market. Legislators felt that Californians were paying too much for elec-
tricity, and AB 1890 was intended to bring lower electricity prices. The con-
cept of deregulation is simple: government-regulated monopolies such as
SDG&E had become bloated and inefficient. By deregulating the market,
competition would produce lower prices. 6 Although AB 1890 initially
achieved lower prices for the consumer, the decrease was not significant (see
Table 1, 1.1-1.3).
Table I
Electricity rates for residential electricity consumers in California
1.1 Highest rate paid by Californians for electricity: 12.50/kWh
1.2 National average electricity rate: 8.90/kWh
1.3 Rate limit during four-year transition period: 9.9850/kWh
1.4 July 1, 1999 - Rate limit terminated by SDG&E on approval Market Rate
from CPUC:
During the period following January 1, 1998, San Diego customers
saved about ten percent on the rate they paid for electricity.' San Diego resi-
dents did not, however, feel this was a reason to warrant switching electricity
providers. Throughout the first months of deregulation, less than three per-
cent of SDG&E's three million customers chose alternative providers (see
Table 2). Because so few switched, some of the new electricity companies
were forced to focus on the industrial sector and ignore the residential mar-
ket. For example, the Houston-based Enron Corporation spent $30 million
campaigning for residential customers that resulted in a disappointing 30,000
residential customers California-wide. 8 As a result, Enron decided to con-
centrate on the industrial sector, and, when that proved unprofitable, Enron
focused its efforts elsewhere in the country. Enron will continue to serve the
30,000 customers who switched. With SDG&E's early termination of the
rate cap, however, it is possible that more customers may choose other pro-
viders if SDG&E does not maintain competitive energy prices.
Insignificant savings are just one of the reasons less than three percent
of San Diego residents switched electricity providers. The main reason is the
sheer complexity of the process, which prevents the appearance of any clear
incentives for consumers to switch. For example, in order to finance the ten
percent rate reduction, $6 billion in bonds were issued. The consumers,
56. Telephone Interview with Peter Murphy, Professor of Economics at the University of
New South Wales (Sept. 3, 1998).
57. See California Public Utilities Commission, Plug In, Califronia! (visited April 26,
2000) <http:llwww.cpuc.ca.gov/divisionslCSD/ELECTRIC/electric.html>.
58. Telephone Interview with Tom Acuna, Land Planner for SDG&E (Jan. 6, 1998).
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through their electric bills, ultimately pay for the bonds. Some people, such
as consumer advocate Harvey Rosenfield, see this as a shell game. On his
electric bill from Southern California Edison, Rosenfield saw that he had
been given a $12.02 discount due to the rate reduction, but he had paid
$16.16 in financing costs for the reduction. 9 Respondents to this quandary
claim that, although the finance charges may initially be high, the charges
will decline as the bonds' principal is reduced, resulting in a benefit for con-
sumers.
Exactly how consumers will benefit was not explained clearly enough to
consumers, and, by November of 1998, consumer groups had placed Propo-
sition 9 on the state ballot. Proposition 9 prohibited the electric utilities from
charging the CTC to recover costs related to nuclear power plants, prohibited
the utilities from forcing electricity customers to finance the $6 billion in
bonds, and required a twenty percent reduction in electricity rates instead of
the original ten percent reduction. Supporters of Proposition 9, such as the
Consumers Union, Ralph Nader, the Utility Reform Network, and the
League of Women Voters, argued that it would give customers a true rate cut
and prevent the utilities from passing the transition charges on to the con-
sumers.' The proposition's opponents, however, argued that changing the
source of repayment for the bonds from the customers to taxpayers would
decrease local and state bond ratings.6' In the end, voters chose not to pass
Proposition 9, perhaps because voters did not fully understand the current
deregulation situation or what Proposition 9 offered.62 In any case, it is obvi-
ous that there is no clear consensus on the money-saving ability of Califor-
nia's deregulation. Without any explicit incentives to save money through
deregulation, it is understandable why so few consumers switched energy
providers.
Customers did not experience significant savings during the first year of
deregulation, and they were not given a clear consensus on the money-
saving ability of California's deregulation. The result is that over ninety-
seven percent of San Diego electricity customers decided to retain SDG&E
as their electricity provider. This allows SDG&E to maintain an informal
monopoly in the deregulated market.
59. See Michael White, Power Rate Cut Costing Us More? Foe Misreads Bill, Deregula-
tors Reply, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 19, 1998, at Cl.
60. See Ed Mendel, Sparks Fly Over Utilities Measure: Consumer Groups vs. Broad
Coalition, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Oct. 11, 1998, at Al.
61. See id.
62. See Craig D. Rose, Neither Side of Prop. 9 Likes Process, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.,
Nov. 5, 1998, at A24.
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Table 2
Customer activity during deregulation
[Vol. 36
Month # switching # Returning Total # SDG&E Cus-
(per month) (per month) tomers\
(running total)
October 1997 - - 1,200,000
November 1997 224 0 1,199,776
December 1997 612 0 1,199,164
January 1998 268 0 1,198,896
February 1998 828 0 1,198,068
March 1998 1,892 12 1,196,188
April 1998* 6,878 81 1,189,391
May 1998 1,562 104 1,187,933
June 1998 1,840 143 1,186,236
July 1998 5,074 375 1,181,537
August 1998 5,897 242 1,175,882
September 1998 4,225 2,2146'3 1,173,871
TOTAL 29,300 3,171 1,173,871
(97.8% remained)
"1' month of deregulation
Based on the first eighteen months of deregulation, the fact that SDG&E has
maintained a firm hold over the electricity generation market illustrates that
AB 1890 has yet to effectively introduce competition into San Diego's elec-
tricity market. If this trend continues, a competitive market may not be real-
ized, and SDG&E would once again be free to formulate pricing structures
without fear of major competitive or, more importantly, legislative restric-
tions.
CONCLUSION
Based on the economic effects of the first eighteen months of San
63. This large influx of customers returning to SDG&E could be attributed to the closure
of an electricity corporation, Boston-Finney. See California Public Utilities Commission, In-
vestigation into the Operations and Praclices of Boston-Finney, Decision 98-03-035, Investi-
gation 98-02-004 (Mar. 12, 1998), available in Lexis-Nexis, 1998 Cal. PUC LEXIS 83.
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Diego's deregulated electricity generation market and on SDG&E, deregula-
tion is beneficial for SDG&E in three ways. First, during its first year and a
half, deregulation has significantly altered the basic structure of electricity
consumption in San Diego. SDG&E reacted to these changes by restructur-
ing its electric generation operations as a separate holding company. This
modification allowed SDG&E to become more efficient and profitable in a
deregulated market. Second, SDG&E further adapted to deregulation by re-
configuring its financial strategy. It divested all of its Californian electricity
generation assets, invested in power plants outside of California, and ad-
justed its method of rate-setting. All of these decisions enlarge SDG&E's
potential customer base to thirty-eight million and enable SDG&E to termi-
nate the transition-period rate cap, thereby gaining entry into the young, rela-
tively competition-free deregulated market. Finally, over ninety-seven per-
cent of San Diego electricity customers have chosen to retain SDG&E as
their electricity provider. This enables SDG&E to maintain an informal
short-term monopoly over electricity in San Diego County without fear of
competitive or legislative castigation.
This article, however, is only an examination of the first eighteen
months of deregulation and its effects on SDG&E. Changes are inevitable,
and more research must be done before the full impact of deregulation can
be understood. Of the $230 billion per year electricity market in the United
States, California represents ten percent of the national market and is viewed
as a national model for deregulation. A broader study on the effects of de-
regulation throughout California is crucial to the success of future legislation
as national deregulation gains in popularity.
Electric power is the largest industry in America ever to be deregulated.
It is significantly larger than industries such as gas, airline, trucking, rail-
road, and long-distance telephone service, which have all undergone deregu-
lation.65 If electricity deregulation is not closely monitored, millions of citi-
zens could find themselves paying more for electricity than ever before.
64. Future research should focus on the effects of deregulation in areas such as urban
land use and development, environmental issues such as pollution and fossil fuels, and the
experiences of new electricity companies in the deregulated market.
65. See Brian O'Reilley, Transforming the Power Business, FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 1997, at
142.
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